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Abstract
This paper studies the labor market returns to quality of higher education for
low-skilled students. Using a regression discontinuity design, we compare students
who marginally pass and marginally fail the French high school exit exam from the
first attempt. Threshold crossing leads to an improvement in the quality, but has
no effect on the quantity, of higher education pursued. Specifically, students who
marginally pass are more likely to enroll in STEM majors and universities with better
peers. Further, marginally passing increases earnings by 13.6 percent at the age of 27
to 29. Our findings show that low-skilled students experience large gains from having
the opportunity to access higher quality postsecondary education.
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1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, access to postsecondary education has become more preva-
lent. In the United States, the percentage of 18 to 24 year olds enrolled in postsecondary
institutions increased from 25.7% in 1970 to 41% in 2012.1 With college becoming more
attainable, students are now encouraged to seek higher quality postsecondary education, as
it is associated with significant gains in the labor market. In fact, parents in the United
States spend a large amount of resources to help their children gain access to “better” uni-
versities. Furthermore, governments have been increasingly encouraging students to pursue
degrees in the fields of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM). From a
policy perspective, these fields are perceived to be the basis for innovation, and recent reports
suggest the presence of a persistent and growing wage premium for STEM jobs. This raises
an important question about whether all students benefit from changes in field of study and
college quality.
Recent studies have documented large labor market returns to attending the most selec-
tive institutions and degrees.2 Nonetheless, it is unclear whether students who are at the
low end of the skill distribution can benefit from an increase in quality of higher education.
Knowing whether labor market gains exist for low-skilled students is important to inform
student choice, especially since the returns can be quite heterogeneous and may be driven
by high-skilled students (Andrews, Li and Lovenheim, 2012). With soaring tuition costs,
it is essential to understand what the right education for each type of student is, not just
whether higher education is right for everyone.
This paper studies the labor market returns to quality of postsecondary education for
low-skilled students. In our context, quality of higher education refers to both the quality of
university attended and field of study pursued—where university quality is proxied by peer
ability. This matters as students in most settings in the world decide on an institution and
a field of study simultaneously.
To investigate this question, we exploit the fact that students in France have to sit for a
series of national written exams in their last year of high school. Those who pass the “high
stakes” exam are awarded the Baccalaure´at Ge´ne´ral or the General Baccalaureate, a degree
which is required to graduate from high school and enroll in a postsecondary institution.
Students are generally given two attempts to pass the exam within the same year. However,
the standards for passing are significantly higher in the first round. We use a regression dis-
1Source: http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_302.60.asp
2For examples, see: Hoekstra, 2009; Saavedra, 2009; Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman, 2013. A notable
exception to this literature is Dale & Krueger (2004) who document no significant earnings premium to
attending an elite university.
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continuity design, which leverages the fact that barely passing versus barely failing the exam
from the first attempt leads to a significant increase in quality of higher education—without
affecting the quantity of education pursued. Our RD design allows us to overcome selection
bias arising from the fact that postsecondary educational choices are likely correlated with
unobservable factors that may also affect future earnings, such as ability and motivation.
Using administrative test score data linked to three detailed surveys, we find that
marginally passing on the first attempt causes a significant increase in the quality of higher
education pursued. Specifically, threshold crossing leads to an improvement in the average
peer quality that students are exposed to in college, to the order of 0.11 standard deviations
in Baccalaureate scores. We also find that marginally passing causes a 15.9 percentage point
increase in the likelihood of pursuing a STEM degree in any university. As detailed in section
6.2, this increase in quality at the threshold is most likely driven by the fact that universities
enroll students on a “first come, first serve” basis as well as discouragement effects on the
part of students.
We then explore the effects of this variation in college quality on labor market outcomes.
Results indicate that marginally passing leads to a 13.6 percent increase in earnings at the
age of 27 to 29, with no significant employment effects. We rule out other possible channels
through which threshold crossing may affect earnings. Specifically, we find no significant
effect on years of postsecondary education or on the probability of having a postsecondary
degree. Moreover, we find no discontinuity in high school graduation rates. This rules out
the direct signaling value of the General Baccalaureate degree as a potential channel that
could be driving the documented increase in earnings. Accordingly, we conclude that having
the option to access higher quality postsecondary education – defined along two separate
dimensions – raises earnings by 13.6 percent for low-skilled students.
Our paper is closest to an emerging body of literature, which uses regression discontinuity
designs to identify the economic returns to quality of higher education.3 Previous studies
uncover a significant earnings premium from attending the most selective pubic university
in a U.S. state (Hoekstra, 2009) and the most selective universities in Colombia (Saavedra,
2009). Other studies look at the gains from accessing 4-year public universities versus 2-year
community colleges in the U.S. (Zimmerman, 2014; Goodman, Hurwitz and Smith, 2015).
Recent papers also document large returns to different fields of study (Hastings, Neilson and
Zimmerman, 2013; Kirkbøen, Leuven and Mogstad, 2014).
We add to this literature in several ways. First, our focus is on low-skilled students who
3Our study is also linked to previous work on the returns to quality of higher education, most of which
focused on high-skilled students who attend the most selective institutions. For examples, see Brewer, Eide
and Ehrenberg (1999), Dale and Krueger (2002), Black and Smith (2006), Hamermesh and Donald (2008).
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do not attend the most selective institutions. Specifically, scoring at the passing threshold on
the first round of the General Baccalaureate exam puts a student near the 28th percentile of
the skill distribution. Zimmerman (2014) also looks at the labor market returns for students
with low academic abilities. The main difference with our study is that the author estimates
the returns to attending different types of postsecondary institutions (4-year versus 2-year
colleges), which ultimately leads to variation in the number of years spent in postsecondary
education. In our study, time to completion for degrees does not vary across institutions,
and the earnings gains are driven by differences in peer quality and access to STEM degrees,
holding quantity of education constant.
Second, we examine the labor market returns to quality of postsecondary education using
an entire national university system. This is in contrast to previous studies, which usually
focus on the returns to attending a single institution or a subset of institutions within a
country (Hoekstra, 2009; Saavedra, 2009; Zimmerman, 2014). A potential drawback of some
of these studies is that they cannot observe the postsecondary educational outcomes for
students who are not enrolled at that specific institution. One advantage of our data is
that it contains the institution and field of study for every student in our sample, allowing
for a clear interpretation of the counterfactual. Similar to our paper, Goodman, Smith and
Hurwitz (2015) also look at low skilled students and have the advantage of being able to
track all students, within the Georgia university system. However, their paper differs from
ours in that they focus on BA completion rates and do not analyze any subsequent labor
market outcomes.
Our study is also related to another strand of literature, which explores the causes and
effects of academic “mismatch”. Recent papers show that high-skilled students from low-
income families tend to “undermatch”, i.e. select universities where the average peer ability
is lower than their own (Hoxby and Avery, 2014). In our case, the students around the
threshold are low-skilled and enroll in universities where the average peer ability is higher
than their own, i.e. “overmatch”. In that sense, part of the documented labor market gains
for our population of interest are driven by an increase in “overmatching”. These findings
complement the Goodman, Hurwitz and Smith (2015) study, which documents gains from
“overmatching” for low-skilled students in the form of increased BA completion rates.
Finally, this paper also contributes to the literature on educational accountability pro-
grams and student outcomes. Recent studies find that the introduction of test-based account-
ability, like exit exams, can increase high school dropout rates (Ou, 2010; Papay, Murnane
and Willett, 2010) and even reduce postsecondary educational attainment (Martorell, 2004).
Our results indicate that exit exams can have unintended consequences that have not been
considered in the literature. Specifically, we document that exit exams may also lead to
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variation in the quality of education pursued.
Section two presents detailed information on the French educational setting. Section
three describes the data we use. Section four reviews our identification strategy. Section five
presents the main empirical results as well as robustness checks. Finally, in section six, we
discuss our results and we conclude in section seven.
2 Institutional Background
2.1 The General Baccalaureate
The Baccalaure´at Ge´ne´ral (or the General Baccalaureate) is a French national degree
awarded to students in their last year of high school. It marks the completion of secondary
education and is also required for enrollment in postsecondary institutions. Within the Gen-
eral Baccalaureate, students can choose one of three specializations: economics & sociology,
literature or sciences. Specializations differ in terms of the subject matter that the curricula
focus on. For instance, students specializing in literature have a curriculum predominately
focused on subjects such as French literature and philosophy even though they are still re-
quired to take all subjects.4 The percentage of students awarded the General Baccalaureate
increased from 67.2% in 1975 to 80.3% in 2002 and 92% in 2013.
In order to be awarded the degree, students must pass a series of national written exams.
The exams cover all subjects taken throughout the last academic year and are common to
all students within the same specialization. Written and oral exams for the French literature
section of the Baccalaureate are administered a year prior to all other tests. Each subject has
a different weight depending on student specialization. The weighted average of all subjects
is then used to compute the final score on the Baccalaureate exam.
After the exams are administered, they are randomly assigned to preselected secondary
school teachers for grading. Two committees supervise the process to guarantee uniform
grading. Juries across France then meet to decide whether a degree is conferred. Importantly,
students’ identities remain anonymous throughout this whole process. In order to be awarded
the degree, a student’s total weighted score must be greater than or equal to 10 out of 20
possible points. The student is also granted an Assez Bien (fairly good), Bien (good) or Tre`s
Bien (very good) distinction if he/she scores above a mark of 12, 14 and 16 respectively.
Students generally have two attempts to pass the exam in a given year. A student who
fails the initial attempt can opt to retake the exam in the second round, conditional on
scoring at least 8 points on the first try. With a total score below 8, the student has to wait
4In the results section, we control for exam specialization fixed effects, and the results remain unchanged.
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an additional year to retake the exam. Students select two failing subjects to be retested on
in the second round of exams. As a result, they vary from one student to the other. The
new grades on these two subjects are then added back to the remaining grades from the
first round to calculate a new total score. The student is granted the degree if his/her new
average score is greater than or equal to 10. The second round exams of the Baccalaureate
are often criticized for being unchallenging and unreliable. This is mainly because they are
conducted orally and administered by only one teacher. This allows students to negotiate a
passing score with their respective teacher (Buchaillat et al., 2011).
2.2 The jury
Following the grading of the first round exams, juries consisting of secondary school
teachers decide on the conferral of the degree. A key part of the jury’s role is to determine
whether a person who is marginally below a certain cutoff should be given extra points to
reach that threshold. If students are awarded the extra points, their final score will be pushed
to somewhere between X and X.1 points, where X represents a significant threshold.5
Students are usually awarded extra points on the subjects for which they obtain the
lowest scores. The jury member who specializes in the corresponding subject has to consent
to giving the extra points. Decisions are made in a short period of time as juries need to
go through hundreds of applications on a given day. Further, the juries tend to be fairly
heterogeneous in their specializations. As a result, two classmates who both marginally fail
the Baccalaureate because of their scores on the mathematics portion of the exam may be
passed by one jury and not the other just because the former had a teacher in mathematics,
while the latter did not. Students are not allowed to interact with jury members, nor do they
know that their files are being reviewed until after the results are announced. Furthermore,
students’ names are hidden from the jury throughout the whole process, as to hinder any
cheating or bribing.
The jury members observe students’ Baccalaureate exams in all subject matter. They
also have the option to access an academic report which contains teachers’ evaluations of the
student’s performance in school. While this may raise concerns over strategic jury behavior
in the allocation of extra points, anecdotal evidence suggests that this option is not always
exercised. Furthermore, previous studies show that the presence of test-based accountability
distorts teacher behavior. For example, Jacob and Levitt (2003) provide evidence of teacher
cheating on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills in Chicago elementary schools. Dee, Jacob, Rockoff
and McCrary (2011) also show that teachers wanting to help their students, tend to inflate
5For example, if a student initially has a score of 9.95 and is deemed worthy of a pass, his/her final
posted grade will be between 10 and 10.1. In our dataset, we can only observe this final heaped grade.
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test scores on New York’s high school assessment exams. In our case, it is possible that
teachers’ desire to help students might cause them to be more lenient in their evaluations.
Thus, even if jury members take into consideration the teachers’ evaluations, they may still
be basing their decision on an unreliable assessment of the student’s performance in school.
In section 5.1, we provide evidence of non-strategic jury behavior. Specifically, we show
the smoothness of baseline characteristics at the passing threshold. Further, in section 5.6,
we also show that excluding the small part of the sample whose scores could have been
manipulated does not change the main results.
2.3 The higher education system in France
There are many academic routes that a student can take upon graduating from high
school. In general, students can apply to universities, higher vocational institutes or the
“Grandes Ecoles” – the most prestigious and selective institutions in France. Back in 2002,
there was no national centralized system that students could use to apply to higher education
establishments.6 Further, students applied to an institution and major simultaneously.
The majority of universities in France are public and offer a variety of different majors.
Time to completion for most degrees is three years.7 By law, the only requirement for
admission is holding the Baccalaureate degree. However, in practice, universities are capacity
constrained and a student can be denied admission to the university and major of his choice.
Priority is usually given to students who reside in the same area as the university. Other
students are admitted on a “first come, first serve basis”. Although public universities are
not normally selective, in a recent report, the National Union of Students in France (L’Union
Nationale des Etudiants de France (UNEF)) found that some universities have been using the
results of the Baccalaureate exam as a screening device to select more successful applicants.8
Students need to have proof of Baccalaureate receipt in order to enroll in universities.
They can apply for admission well after the results of the first and second rounds of the
6Although no national centralized system was in place, students from the Iˆle-de-
France region applied to higher education establishments via a centralized system called
RAVEL. (Source: http://www.lemonde.fr/orientation-scolaire/article/2012/03/08/
apb-ou-le-passage-oblige-pour-acceder-au-superieur_1652943_1473696.html)
7Students received an intermediate degree, the “Diploˆme d’e´tudes universitaires ge´ne´rales” (or DEUG),
after two years in universities. The “Licence” (or the equivalent of the Bachelor’s degree) was awarded
after an extra year. Starting 2003, the DEUG was gradually phased out. However, only 13 universities had
partially eliminated the degree by 2003. We are not too concerned about the effects of this reform on our
sample as more than 90% of the students who failed the first round of the 2002 exams had obtained their
Baccalaureate degree by 2003.
Source: http://www.mesr.public.lu/enssup/dossiers/bologne/processus_bologne.pdf
8Sources: http://lajeunepolitique.com/2013/07/29/27-french-universities-denounced-for-illegal-selection-of-students/
and http://unef.fr/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/DOSSIER-DE-PRESSE-UNEF-2013-FII-11.pdf
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General Baccalaureate are announced. Specifically, for the academic year 2001-2002, the
first round exams took place from June 13 to June 20. Students received the results of the
first round on July 5. The second round oral exams were administered from July 8 to July
11. The final results were announced on July 11. Admissions to universities are usually open
until the beginning of the academic year in September.
The “Grandes Ecoles” are the most prestigious and selective post-baccalaureate institu-
tions in France. They offer degrees in a multitude of fields including engineering, business
and political sciences. Time to completion for these degrees is usually five years. Students
can enroll in the “Grandes Ecoles” either immediately after high school or after attending
two years of preparatory classes in lyceums. Admission to both these routes is based on the
students’ academic results in the last two years of secondary education, their scores on the
French literature portion of the baccalaureate exams and tests that are specific to each insti-
tution. Admissions decisions are made before students sit for the first round of baccalaureate
exams. Further, the low-skilled students that we look at do not attend these institutions.
Appendix A.3 offers a more detailed description of the traditional higher education system.
Admissions to vocational and professional institutes are considered competitive. Most
degrees require three years to complete. Students are in general admitted based on their
academic results in the last two years of secondary education or upon obtaining a distinction
on the baccalaureate exams. Appendix A.4 provides an overview of the vocational higher
education system.
3 Data
Our data links individual-level information on secondary and post-secondary education
to labor market outcomes and are taken from three surveys, the “Panel d’e´le`ves du sec-
ond degre´, recrutement 1995”, administered by the French statistical office (INSEE). The
data contains student demographics, detailed scores on the baccalaureate exams taken from
administrative records, post-secondary field of study, institution attended and graduated,
earnings information and employment status.
Data on post-secondary education are available on a semiannual basis for up to 9 years
after receiving the General Baccalaureate degree. Labor market outcomes are reported
yearly from 2005 to 2012, up to 10 years after the General Baccalaureate exams. Thus,
one advantage of our dataset is that we are able to observe detailed long-term outcomes. A
potential drawback of the data is that it does not include outcomes for individuals working
abroad. Also, some individuals do not report their earnings or drop out of the sample because
they could not be followed by the interviewers. This could potentially cause problems insofar
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as it is correlated with treatment. We address these issues in section 5.1 by showing that
there is no discontinuity in the probability of being observed in the labor market portion of
the survey.
The initial sample consists of 17,830 students who were enrolled in grade 6 (6e`me) in the
academic year 1995-1996. We restrict our data to students who sat for the first round of
the General Baccalaureate exam in the academic year 2001-2002. We do not use the results
from the second round because retaking the exam can induce differences between students
who are marginally below and above the threshold (Martorell and McFarlin Jr., 2011). Fur-
ther, the second round exams can be strategically manipulated as they are conducted orally
and administered by only one teacher. We also exclude students who attended vocational
secondary schooling as their post Baccalaureate academic options are limited.
The main labor market outcome of interest is the natural log of average monthly net
earnings, stacked for the years 2011 and 2012. This results in up to two observations for each
individual. Since earnings of individuals in their early twenties are not usually considered a
good predictor of future income, we use earnings reported approximately 9 to 10 years after
taking the baccalaureate exam, when the students are aged between 27 and 29.
In our analysis of the quality of post-Baccalaureate institutions, the main measure used is
the average Baccalaureate score of all students in our sample attending a certain institution,
i.e average peer performance.9 Thus, we consider a university to be of “better quality” if it
has higher performing peers. Concerning field of study, the main outcome of interest is a
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the student is enrolled in a STEM designated degree
or an advanced business degree. Advanced business degrees are classified as STEM because
they usually require good quantitative skills. A complete account of the majors we designate
as STEM versus non-STEM can be found in Appendix Table A.5.
Finally, we use father’s occupation as a proxy for students’ socioeconomic status. The
occupation of the father is stratified into 42 different positions that are represented by two
digit identifiers. The first digit of each identifier represents one of four main skill levels.
These skill levels are the official French socioeconomic classification as represented by the
“Nomenclature des professions et categories socioprofessionelles” (PCS) and are used as a
reference in all official collective agreements. Our definition of high skilled workers includes
the first two skills levels, while low skilled workers are represented by the last two.
Descriptive statistics for students who sat for the first round of the 2002 General Bac-
calaureate are reported in Table 1. 38 percent of the students are male and 57 percent are
from a high socioeconomic background.10 The average score on the Baccalaureate exam
9Data on out of sample average Baccalaureate score by institution is not available.
1051.61 percent of the students in our initial sample are male. This number is reduced to 38 percent after
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is 11.17 points, with approximately 75 percent of students passing from the first round.
Further, 98 percent of the students in our sample eventually graduate high school (i.e. even-
tually pass the Baccalaureate). Respondents have an average of 3.2 years of postsecondary
education and 28 percent of students are enrolled in a STEM major in their first year of
postsecondary education. As for labor market outcomes, the average monthly net earnings
for individuals in the sample are 1,625 and 1,725 Euros for 2011 and 2012 respectively, with
an employment rate of 93 percent for both years.
4 Identification Strategy
We use a standard regression discontinuity framework (Lee and Lemieux, 2010; Imbens
and Lemieux, 2008) to estimate the effects of passing the Baccalaureate exam from the
first try on educational attainment, quality of education and future labor market outcomes.
The key identifying assumption underlying an RD design is that all determinants of future
outcomes vary smoothly across the threshold. In that sense, any observed discontinuity at
the threshold can be attributed to the causal effect of scoring above a 10 on the Baccalaureate
exam, i.e. passing on the first attempt.
Formally, we estimate the following reduced form equation:
Yi = α + g(Si) + τDi + δXi + i
where the dependent variable Y is the outcome of interest, representing earnings and educa-
tional outcomes for individual i. D is a dummy variable indicating whether a person passed
or failed the French Baccalaureate exam on the first try. S is the running variable and rep-
resents an individual’s score on the first attempt of the exam. It is defined as grade points
relative to the threshold passing grade of 10. The function g(.) captures the underlying
relationship between the running variable and the dependent variable. We allow the slopes
of our fitted lines to differ on either side of the passing threshold by interacting g(.) with
treatment D in order to control for differential trends in grades. X is a vector of controls
that should improve precision by reducing residual variation in the outcome variable, but
should not significantly alter the treatment estimates. The term  represents the error term.
The parameter of interest is τ which gives us the local average treatment effect for each
regression.
excluding students who were in vocational secondary schooling. However, this does not pose any threat to
identification, as we observe no discontinuity in the likelihood of being of a certain sex at the threshold (See
Section 5.1).
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In all regressions, we use population survey weights to estimate treatment effects for the
various outcomes of interest.11 Further, heteroskedastic adjusted errors are used in all re-
gressions.12 There are two ways to estimate the parameter τ in an RD design. First, one can
impose a specific parametric function for g(.), using all the available grade data, to estimate
the above equation via ordinary least squares —typically referred to as the global polynomial
approach. Alternatively, one can specify g(.) to be a linear function of S and estimate the
equation over a narrower range of data, using a local linear regression. In this paper, the pre-
ferred specifications are drawn from local linear regressions within 1.5 grade points on either
side of the cutoff using uniform kernel weights. This avoids the problem of identifying local
effects using variation too far away from the passing threshold. Our choice of bandwidth
is motivated by graphical fit, data driven optimal bandwidth selectors and the existence of
other cutoff grades. Specifically, we use a robust data driven procedure, outlined in Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014), to predict the optimal bandwidths (Henceforth CCT).13 This
bandwidth selector improves upon previous selectors that yield large bandwidths. Specifi-
cally, it accounts for bias-correction stemming from large initial bandwidth choice, while also
correcting for the poor finite sample performance attributed to this bias correction. While
our preferred specifications are drawn from local linear regressions, we still present results for
a variety of bandwidths and functional forms, as has become standard in the RD literature
(Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The results are robust to these varying specifications leading us
to conclude that passing the Baccalaureate exam from the first attempt results in significant
differences in quality of schooling and subsequent labor market outcomes.
5 Results
5.1 Tests of the Validity of the RD design
A standard concern with any RD design is the ability for individuals to precisely control
the assignment variable. In our context, this can occur if students and/or graders manipulate
scores in such a way that the distribution of unobservable determinants of education and
earnings are discontinuous at the cutoff. The first concern is if students themselves are able
to precisely sort to either side of the cutoff, especially given that the cutoff score is known
beforehand. However, the Baccalaureate exam comprises all subject matter taken during
11Results remain unchanged when using un-weighted regressions.
12Our running variable is fairly continuous as it is reported to the nearest one hundredth of a decimal
point (i.e 9.91, 9.92, etc...). Accordingly, we are not too concerned about random specification error resulting
from a discrete running variable as reported in Lee and Card (2008).
13The optimal local linear bandwidth for most of our specifications ranges from 1.2 to 1.5 score points.
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the year, most of which is in essay format, making it highly unlikely for any student to be
able to precisely control their grade. A potentially more worrying concern is whether graders
are sorting students to either side of the passing threshold in a non random way. Indeed, if
borderline students with better future prospects are marginally passed at a higher rate than
those with worse prospects, then our education and earnings estimates would most likely be
upward biased.
In addressing these concerns, we consider a few tests that have become standard in the
RD literature. The first informative test would be to check for any discontinuity in the
density of grades at the cutoff point (McCrary, 2008). The rationale behind this test is
that if individuals are manipulating grades around the cutoff, then the grade distribution
will be discontinuously uneven for grades just below and above the cutoff. However, a run-
ning variable with a continuous density is neither necessary nor sufficient for identification.
Specifically, this test may not be as helpful if discontinuities in the grade distribution can
be attributed to other exogenous factors such as grade rounding.14 As mentioned in Section
2.2, after the initial grading of the exams, jury members decide whether they should award
extra points to individuals just short of an important cutoff. The empirical distribution in
Panel A of Figure 1 is consistent with this idea. At each representative grade cutoff, we
observe a dip in the number of students who are just short of said cutoff combined with a
spike in the number of students who are just above it.15 This heaping is consistent with
a priori expectations that jury members are bunching grades at important cutoffs. These
distributional discontinuities could be the result of strategic cutoff crossing, or an alterna-
tive random sorting process. While, the first case is obviously problematic, the latter poses
no threat to identification. As highlighted in McCrary (2008):“If teachers select at random
which students receive bonus points, then an ATE would still be identified.” In what follows,
we provide evidence against strategic cutoff crossing.
In the presence of a running variable that is discontinuously distributed for exogenous
reasons, an informative visual test for grade manipulation is to verify the smoothness of
baseline characteristics. This test has become standard in the RD literature as an alternative
and often preferred approach for testing the validity of the RD design (Lee and Lemieux,
2010). The intuition here is that if we observe discontinuities in exogenous variables, then the
treatment is not randomly assigned and an average treatment effect is not identified. Further,
as part of this exercise, we also check for the presence of a discontinuity in the probability of
being observed in the follow-up labor force segment of the survey. Specifically, if probability
14See Zimmerman (2014) for such a case.
15Recall, that the cutoff grades of 8 ,10 ,12 ,14 and 16 all serve a specific purpose in terms of awarded
degree.
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of survey response is correlated with treatment, then the standard interpretation of our
treatment effect would be problematic.
All panels in Figure 2 present estimates of the effects of threshold crossing on baseline
characteristics. These figures take the same form as those after them in that circles represent
local averages over a 0.25 score range. All figures represent local linear regressions within 1.5
score points of the cutoff. Further, estimates are computed using population weights with
robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
We first check for the presence of a discontinuity in the averaged score of the oral and
written French literature portion of the Baccalaureate exam. There are two advantages to
looking at this variable. First, these exams are administered in grade 11, one year before
all other Baccalaureate tests. In that sense, it is a very recent indicator of student ability.
Second, jury members cannot award extra points on this particular component of the Bac-
calaureate exam. Panel A of Figure 2 reveals an insignificant treatment effect (0.0196) on
the average score of the French literature exam. We further test for a discontinuity in the
Brevet national exam test scores. This high stakes exam is taken in grade 9 and is required
for entry into high school, with the grading scale also being from 0-20. We have the averaged
score for the three major components of the Brevet exam (Mathematics, French and foreign
language). We also look at another national exam taken at the beginning of grade 6. The
goal of this exam is to evaluate the level of students in mathematics and its grading scale is
from 0 to 78. In Panel B of Figure 2, we find an insignificant treatment estimate (0.158) on
Brevet scores. Panel C of Figure 2 also shows an insignificant treatment effect (-0.847) on
the mathematics exam scores in grade 6. This eases concerns that jury members might be
sorting students around the cutoff, based on their academic ability.
In Panel D, we check for the presence of a discontinuity in the likelihood of being from
a high socioeconomic status (S.E.S). We also find no significant effect (0.022). Further, in
Panels E through G, we check for the smoothness of covariates that are known to affect
education and wages, but that should be independent of treatment. Estimates on gender
(0.0029), order of birth (-0.098) and number of siblings (0.138) are all statistically insignifi-
cant. To alleviate any concerns over bandwidth and/or functional form chosen, we present
the baseline characteristics over varying functional forms and bandwidths in Table 2. All
estimates remain statistically insignificant. Finally, we show that the predicted Baccalaure-
ate score, as a function of the above covariates, is continuous at the cutoff. Both panels in
Figure 3 highlight these results using a local linear and global polynomial fit respectively.
These results reject the hypothesis of strategic threshold crossing in favor of a non strate-
gic sorting hypothesis.16 They are also consistent with the fact that students’ identities are
16In Table A1, we also show that the baseline characteristics are smooth around all other important
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never disclosed to neither graders nor jury members.
As highlighted in Barreca, Lindo and Waddell (Forthcoming), heaping in the running
variable can have serious consequences if it is associated with determinants of the outcome
variables. However, this will only bias the estimates to the extent that it creates imbalances
in outcome determinants around the cutoff. Therefore, as a complement to our balanced
characteristics test, we implement additional checks to further investigate the existence of
strategic sorting. Specifically, we run ‘Donut type’ RDs that deal with the heaped data
at each cutoff. Panel B of Figure 1 highlights the new distribution of grades resulting from
Donut type RD regressions, which essentially involves cutting out all potentially manipulable
data points. We implement these regressions in Section 5.6 with the main results remaining
unchanged.
Finally, if marginally failing students were more likely to leave the country in order
to have access to higher quality universities or if they endogenously chose not to respond
to the follow up survey as a result of failing, then the interpretation of our results would
be problematic. As an important RD validity check, we show that there is no significant
threshold crossing effect on the likelihood of being observed in the follow-up wage survey.
These results are reported in Panel H of Figure 2 and Table 2. The absence of any differential
selection into the earnings sample alleviates any concerns attributed to leaving the sample
due to barely failing the French Baccalaureate exam.
5.2 Is the Baccalaureate cutoff rule binding in practice?
In this paper, we estimate the impact of passing the French Baccalaureate from the first
try on future educational and labor market outcomes. Before proceeding with the results, we
first show that there is a discontinuity in the first round pass rate at the threshold. Figure 4
is a graphical representation of the probability of being awarded the Baccalaureate degree on
the first round, conditional on first round exam scores. The figure shows a clear discontinuity
at the cutoff, with a sharp 100 percentage point jump in the probability of passing at the
threshold. This indicates that the Baccalaureate cutoff rule was fully binding in practice
and subsequently rules out any non-compliance issues.
thresholds. Indeed, if juries were strategically manipulating results, then this phenomenon should occur at
all important cutoffs. We find no evidence of significant discontinuities at any of these cutoffs for our above
baseline covariates.
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5.3 Impact on Quantity of Education
In this section, we investigate whether marginally passing the Baccalaureate exam on the
first round affects the quantity of education pursued.
We first check whether barely passing from the first attempt affects the likelihood of ever
graduating from high school. In Panel A of Figure 5, we plot the probability of ever passing
the French Baccalaureate exam as a function of the first exam score.17 Panel A shows an
insignificant treatment effect (0.003) on the probability of ever graduating from high school.
Estimates for varying bandwidths and functional forms are reported in Panel A of Table 3,
with the results remaining statistically insignificant.
Next, we look at whether there is a treatment effect on the likelihood of receiving a post-
baccalaureate degree. Panel B of Figure 5 shows no significant effect of threshold crossing
on the probability of having a post-baccalaureate degree. The results remain insignificant
over varying bandwidths and functional forms as is evident from Panel B of Table 3.
We then look at whether threshold crossing leads to variation in the number of years
of postsecondary education pursued. In Panel C of Figure 5, we plot the years of post
baccalaureate education as a function of the first round exam scores. We also find no
significant treatment effect. Corresponding regression estimates are reported in Panel C of
Table 3. The estimates are consistent with the figure and rule out any significant effects.
Finally, we investigate whether threshold crossing affects the age of post-secondary grad-
uation. In Panel D of Figure 5, we plot the age at graduation as a function of first round
exam scores. We find a significant treatment effect (0.39 years) when using a local linear
regression over a bandwidth of 1.5 points. However, as shown in Panel D of Table 3, this
estimate is not robust to different bandwidths and functional forms.
All results remain unchanged with the addition of controls. These controls include exam
specialization fixed effects, date of birth, number of siblings, birth order, socioeconomic
status, scores on the Brevet examination, scores on the French portion of the Baccalaureate
taken in grade 11 and scores in the grade 6 national assessment exam in Mathematics.
In summary, we rule out that passing the General Baccalaureate on the first attempt
affects the quantity of education pursued.
5.4 Impact on Quality of Education
In this section, we explore whether passing the Baccalaureate exam on the first attempt
affects quality of postsecondary education pursued. Specifically, we look at the impact of
17Global polynomial figures for all “Quantity of education” variables can be found in Appendix Figure
A1.
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threshold crossing on the quality of institution attended and the likelihood of enrolling in a
STEM major.
We rely on in-sample institution average Baccalaureate score, i.e peer performance, as a
proxy for institution quality.18 In Panel A of Figure 6, we plot the mean student Baccalaure-
ate score for each university as a function of first round exam scores. As in previous figures,
circles represent local averages over a 0.25 score range. All figures represent a population
weighted local linear regression using data within 1.5 points on either side of the threshold,
which has again been chosen by the CCT bandwidth selector.19
We find a significant threshold crossing effect to the order of 0.26 Baccalaureate points.
This indicates that the average peer quality that students experience in college increases
significantly and discontinuously—to the order of 0.11 of a standard deviation in Baccalau-
reate scores—as a result of passing from the first attempt. To put things into perspective,
this would be comparable to attending a US college whose student body averaged 1024 SAT
points off of a base college whose students averaged 1000 SAT points.20 Since our study
deals with marginal public universities on either side of the threshold, as opposed to elite
versus non-elite type universities, the order of magnitude seems reasonable and economically
significant. For example, Hoekstra (2009) finds that attending the most selective in-state
university, whose peers average 65 SAT points higher than the next university, results in a
20 percent earnings premium for males.
Panel A of Table 4 depicts discontinuity estimates using different bandwidths and func-
tional forms. The estimates range from 0.21 to 0.29 Baccalaureate points, equivalent to 0.097
to 0.138 of a S.D. in Baccalaureate test scores as illustrated in Panel B of Table 4. Fur-
ther, all estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level. Additionally, the inclusion of
controls does not significantly change the estimates, which is consistent with the identifying
assumption.
18A potential drawback to this approach is that the relatively small number of observations within each
institution could lead to inference problems. Specifically, all individuals within the same institution share
a common measurement error component. We correct for this by clustering at the institution level thus
allowing for a grouped error structure.
19The negative slope on the left hand side of the cutoff is consistent with a first come, first served
admissions mechanism (See Sections 2.3 and 6.2 for details). Specifically, students scoring just shy of a
cutoff are more likely to pass on the second round than those farther to the left of the cutoff, who are more
likely to pass on the first round of the following year. The unintended consequence of this is that students
farther to the left of the cutoff have a better pick of universities the following year. However, we must
also note that the negative slope is not statistically significant. In Appendix A2, we also present global
polynomial figures that reveal the entire fit.
20We arrive at this comparison in the following way: The average institution Baccalaureate score just
to the left of the cutoff is 10.82 points. In our data, this corresponds to ranking in the 45th percentile of
all students. We then compare this number to the 45th percentile score of SAT National Percentile Ranks,
which is equivalent to 1000 (We use the Verbal + Mathematics percentile rank).
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Students in France simultaneously enroll in a postsecondary institution and field of study.
Consequently, we check whether there is a discontinuity in the likelihood of being enrolled
in a STEM versus non-STEM major. Panel B of Figure 6 plots the probability of being
enrolled in a STEM major as a function of first exam score. Threshold crossing induces a
15.9 percentage point increase in the probability of being in a STEM major. Panel C of
Table 4 reports the discontinuity estimates using different bandwidths and functional forms
and with the inclusion of controls. All estimates remain statistically significant at the 5%
level.
The data allows us to observe whether an individual graduates from a certain institution
rather than just being admitted to an institution. This is potentially important as completion
rates are sometimes low and vary across institutions, which would in turn complicate the
interpretation of the results. Consequently, we present local linear estimates on the quality
of institutions that students graduate from as well as the likelihood of graduating with a
STEM-designated major in Appendix Figures A3. All figures show a clear discontinuity at
the threshold, similar to the initial attendance figures. This lead us to conclude that any
potential labor market effects should be the result of both attending and graduating with
higher quality schooling.
5.5 Impact on Labor Market Outcomes
We now turn to whether the documented variation in quality of education is associated
with positive labor market returns. Figure 7 graphically depicts the relationship between
labor market outcomes and the distance from the first round exam cutoff. All panels report
estimates from local linear regressions using a bandwidth of 1.5 points, with standard errors
clustered at the individual level.21 We first check whether threshold crossing generates
any significant changes in the likelihood of employment. In Panel A of Figure 7, we find an
insignificant -0.008 percentage point change in the likelihood of employment at the threshold.
As shown in Panel A of Table 5, all regression estimates remain statistically insignificant
over varying bandwidths and functional forms. Further, the addition of controls does not
significantly affect estimates.
We then explore whether threshold crossing affects earnings. Specifically, we focus on
the average monthly net earnings for the years 2011 and 2012. The earnings from both
years are stacked, resulting in up to two observations per individual. Accordingly, standard
errors are clustered at the individual level. We look at net monthly earnings as a function
of exam score in Panel B of Figure 7. We find that first round passing is associated with
21Global polynomial figures for all “Labor market” variables can be found in Appendix Figure A4.
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a e252 monthly premium. Additionally, in Panel C, we look at logged monthly earnings.
We find that threshold crossing leads to a 12.8 log point (13.6 percent) increase in earnings.
Corresponding regression estimates are shown in Panels B and C of Table 5. These estimates
are robust to different bandwidths and functional forms. For instance, the estimates for
logged earnings vary from 12.6 to 18 log points and are all statistically significant at the 1%
level. Further, the addition of controls does not significantly alter the estimates for earnings,
which is consistent with the identifying assumption. We conclude that while passing the
Baccalaureate exam on the first try does not affect the likelihood of employment, it does
significantly alter future earnings.
5.6 Robustness Checks
Before interpreting our results, we run additional robustness checks. Primarily, we ad-
dress concerns that heaping in the running variable could lead to bias—even in the presence
of balanced covariates. To alleviate such concerns, we run ‘Donut type’ RD regressions that
involve dropping all potentially manipulable data points around the threshold (See Dahl,
Løken and Mogstad, 2014 and Zimmerman, 2014 for similar applications of Donut RDs). In
our setting, scoring within 0.25 points to the left of a cutoff generally allows for a student’s
grade to be reconsidered. Further, grades are pushed to anywhere between X to X.1 points,
with X representing a respective cutoff. As a result, we drop all individuals whose first exam
grade lies anywhere between 7.75-8.1, 9.75-10.1, 11.75-12.1, 13.75-14.1 and 15.75-16.1 points.
The new distribution of grades is highlighted in Panel B of Figure 1. Regression estimates
from these ‘Donut’ type RD specifications can be found in Tables 6, 7 and 8, where we report
modified treatment estimates for quantity of education, quality of education and labor mar-
ket outcomes respectively. We report all outcome variables over the same bandwidths and
functional forms previously analyzed. Precision is reduced in most specifications, which is
to be expected given the reduced data. However, all previously significant treatment effects
remain so. Further, point estimates slightly increase for most specifications, which is at odds
with a strategic sorting story. If jury members were endogenously sorting students, then we
would expect our new point estimates to be significantly reduced.
Generally, jury members give special attention to grades that are within 0.25 points short
of a cutoff. However, we cannot rule out the possibility of certain jury members awarding
extra points for scores that are even further away from the threshold. To further investigate
this issue, we take a closer look at the distribution of Baccalaureate test scores within a 9
to 11 grade window in Figure 8. Noticeably, the distribution of test scores drops sharply
and linearly in the range of 9.65 to 9.99 Baccalaureate points. This sudden drop in the
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distribution is consistent with the potential for manipulation of test scores as reported in
Dee, Jacob, Rockoff and McCrary (2011). As a result, we further exclude from our ‘Donut
RD’ analysis all individuals scoring between 9.65 and 9.75 points which effectively takes care
of all test scores that could potentially be manipulated. We then reestimate all treatment
effects. These results are also reported in Tables 6, 7 and 8. Precision is further reduced in
most specifications. Nonetheless, all previously significant effects remain so. Altogether, the
results from both Donut RD specifications reject a strategic sorting hypothesis and are in
line with our main results and conclusions.
Finally, we check for earnings discontinuities at pseudo cutoff scores around the passing
threshold score. To do so, we gradually estimate treatment effects for 50 fake cutoff scores
on either side of the original passing threshold. We use logged monthly earnings as the
outcome variable in this placebo test. Results indicate that the cutoff score of 10 provides
for the largest and most significant discontinuity. Figure A5 of the appendix summarizes
these findings by graphing t-statistics for these various placebo cutoff scores. The estimated
t-statistic at the zero cutoff score represents the original one, with all others being placebo
statistics for fake cutoff treatments relative to the original.22 All significant estimates are
highlighted in the graph with a large red filled circle. We observe only 2 significant treatment
effects out of a possible 100. We conclude that no other important cutoff value (8 ,12, 14,
16) has a significant effect on earnings except for the original high stakes passing cutoff of 10.
These results also provide further evidence on the importance of passing the Baccalaureate
exam from the first round and the significant earnings premium that this induced variation
leads to.
6 Discussion
6.1 Interpreting the documented labor market premium
We interpret our results as “intent to treat” effects whereby increased access to higher
quality schooling results in a 13.6 percent earnings premium for the low skilled student. In
fact, our “first stage” results show that a significant proportion of students who pass from
the first round attend a university with higher performing peers and/or are more likely to
pursue a STEM major. This allows us to measure the effect of increased access to higher
quality education on later lifetime outcomes, but not the effect of any specific change in
higher education quality.
22Each open circle represents the t-statistic from a local linear regression of bandwidth = 1.5 Baccalaureate
points.
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Our interpretation hinges on the fact that only quality of education dimensions vary at
the cutoff. As a result, we rule out other potential channels through which marginally pass-
ing the Baccalaureate exam on the first round could affect earnings. First, we show that
there is no impact on the likelihood of ever being awarded the Baccalaureate degree. This
is not surprising as students are required to hold the degree if they wish to enroll in post-
secondary education. Furthermore, students who want to enter the labor force immediately
after high school could use the baccalaureate degree as a signal of their ability to potential
employers. Therefore, students are incentivized to retake the exam until they are awarded
the degree. This is in line with recent evidence which finds that exit exams don’t cause
increased high school dropout rates (Clark and See, 2011). Second, we find that threshold-
crossing has no impact on the likelihood of obtaining a post-baccalaureate degree nor on the
years of postsecondary education. These results are expected given the vast number of non
selective universities and majors in France whose only requirement for admission is holding
the Baccalaureate degree.
Another factor that could affect the interpretation of our estimates is that the documented
increase in earnings could be driven by employers who use passing on the first round as a
signal of productivity. To alleviate such concerns, we focus on a segment of the population
who have chosen not to attend college.23 If employers are using the first round of the
Baccalaureate exam as a signal of productivity, then we would expect the signal to be most
pronounced for this segment of the population. Appendix Figure A6 shows that there is
no threshold crossing effect on earnings for this subpopulation. While the estimate is not
precise due to small sample issues, it is still comforting to see that there is no discernible
discontinuity at the cutoff.24 Furthermore, it is unlikely that employers are able to distinguish
students who marginally passed and marginally failed the first round exams.
A final concern is that age of Baccalaureate or post Baccalaureate graduation is lower
for marginal passers. In this case, at least part of the observed earnings premium might be
explained by work experience. While we cannot reject the existence of a threshold crossing
effect on age of post baccalaureate graduation, the results indicate that marginally passing
from the first attempt potentially increases the age at graduation. This would cause us to
understate the earnings estimate, in so far as work experience is positively correlated with
earnings. The results are not surprising given that some STEM majors require more time to
complete in France. For example, engineering degrees are awarded after five years in higher
education, as opposed to three years for most other degrees. Finally, for age at Baccalaureate
23We have previously shown that there is no discontinuity in college attendance which is why we are not
too wary about conditioning on non-college attendance.
24We use a quadratic polynomial regression because there is insufficient data to run meaningful local
linear regressions.
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receipt, Appendix figure A7 reveals no significant treatment effect.
6.2 First time passing and variation in quality of higher education
In this paper, we argue that marginally passing the General Baccalaureate exam from
the first attempt raises earnings through an improvement in the quality of higher education.
We present three possible mechanisms for the observed increase in education quality.
First, students who marginally fail from the first attempt have to sit for a second round of
exams. The second round results are announced a week after the first round scores. Further,
universities generally enroll students on a “first come, first serve” basis and students need to
have proof of Baccalaureate receipt in order to enroll in universities. As a result, this extra
week may constitute an important advantage for those who wish to enroll in university/major
combinations that are in high demand. Indeed, data from one of our surveys lends support to
this channel. Specifically, students were asked whether they were satisfied with the university
and major they were enrolled in. For those who expressed discontent, the survey also asked
for the reason they did not enroll in the university/major of their choice. Amongst those
who failed the first round, 11.9% answered that they were too late in enrolling in their first
choice of university/major. This number decreases to 4.9% for those who passed on the first
round.
Second, the documented variation in higher education quality could be due to a discour-
agement effect. This would be in line with previous evidence which shows that exit exams can
discourage students by increasing high school dropout rates and lowering higher educational
attainment (Martorell, 2004; Ou, 2010; Papay, Murnane and Willett, 2010). In our case, the
exit exam does not affect the quantity of education pursued, since most students pass on
the second round and universities are generally not selective. Nonetheless, marginally failing
students may still be discouraged by their first round results making them more susceptible
to enrolling in non STEM majors or universities with lower skilled peers.
Third, universities could perceive the timing of degree receipt as a signal of student
ability, which would then factor into admissions decisions. This is reinforced by the fact that
the second round of exams have lower standards for passing and are often deemed unreliable
(see Buchaillat et al., 2011). By law, universities in France cannot be selective, but they are
capacity constrained. Back in 2002, they were required to give priority in their admissions
to students residing in the same area. Other students usually enrolled on a “first come,
first serve” basis. However, in a recent report, the National Union of Students in France
(L’Union Nationale des Etudiants de France) found that some universities had been using
the results from the Baccalaureate exam to select students into majors that were in high
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demand. Thus, we cannot completely rule out selection by universities as a channel through
which marginally failing the first round affects the quality of higher education.
6.3 Returns to STEM education?
Although it would be interesting to examine the effects for different subgroups of students,
our sample size does not allow us to run a thorough heterogeneity analysis.
We do however investigate the impacts for students from lower socioeconomic back-
grounds, with the caveat of reduced precision. This allows us to present suggestive evidence
on the earnings premium of pursuing a STEM degree, holding quality of university constant.
To do so, we look at a subpopulation of students whose quality of schooling is likely to differ
in only one dimension. Specifically, students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds may
be less likely to attend higher quality institutions. In fact, there is clear evidence that low-
income students tend to undermatch and not attend the highest quality colleges available
to them (Roderick et al., 2008; Bowen et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2013). This seems highly
plausible in our context as the default choice of education in France is to attend the public
university that is closest to the area of residence. These universities are not always of the
highest quality and are a less expensive option for lower earning families, in terms of housing
and transportation. Further, the possibility of pursuing a STEM degree at a lower quality
university is higher than it would be at a better quality one. The results from Table 9 are
consistent with this idea. Our preferred specification in column 3 suggests that students from
low socioeconomic backgrounds are not attending better universities. However, they are 26.4
percentage point more likely to pursue a STEM degree.25 We also estimate an 11.4 percent
earnings premium for this subgroup of students. If we were to believe that no other changes
were occurring at the threshold, then rescaling the reduced form wage estimate by the doc-
umented increase in the likelihood of pursuing a STEM major suggests a 43 percent return
to pursuing a STEM designated major for students of low socioeconomic backgrounds.26
6.4 How does quality of higher education affect earnings?
The two classical channels through which quality of higher education can affect earnings
are human capital formation and signaling. Our measures of quality of education are average
peer ability and enrollment in STEM majors, which can affect future earnings through both
signaling (i.e. better peers attend better institutions) and human capital accumulation. One
25We do not provide any figures for these results as the smaller samples leads to the under-smoothing of
mean plots.
26It should be noted that this is only suggestive evidence as the threshold crossing effect on quality of
university is not very precise.
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test of the signaling channel would be to look at whether the earnings effect decreases with
age (Hoekstra, 2009). Our data only allows us to observe detailed labor market outcomes
between the ages of 27 to 29.27 Thus, we are unable to perform this test.
Another possible explanation for the earnings effect, that would favor the human capital
channel, is that students who are marginally above the cutoff attend university/major com-
binations that have more resources. The vast majority of universities in France are public
and receive most of their funding from the government.28 Unfortunately, detailed data on
spending per university is not available for the period of our study.29 Therefore, we are
unable to test whether universities and majors affect earnings through providing students
with better resources.
7 Conclusion
This paper looks at whether low-skilled students gain from an increase in quality of
higher education. We exploit the fact that students in France have to pass a national exam
to graduate from high school and enroll in universities. Using a regression discontinuity
design, we compare the education and labor market outcomes of students who marginally
pass and marginally fail the exam from the first attempt. We find that marginally passing
has no effect on the quantity of education pursued. It does however improve the quality
of peers that a student is exposed to in his postsecondary institution and increases the
likelihood of enrolling in a STEM major. Marginally passing also leads to a 13.6 percent
increase in earnings at the age of 27 to 29. We interpret our findings as intent to treat effects
whereby having the opportunity to access higher quality postsecondary education results in
a significant earnings premium for low-skilled students.
We believe that this paper contributes to the understanding of how education affects
different types of individuals. Our results can be seen as complementing recent findings
which indicate that low-skilled students realize labor market and educational gains from
accessing 4-year colleges in the U.S. (Zimmerman, 2014; Goodman, Hurwitz and Smith,
2015). Specifically, we show that these gains are not restricted to increasing low skilled
students’ access to college, but are also realized by increasing their access to better quality
colleges and majors. To the extent that our results can be extended to other settings, these
27Even though we observe labor market outcomes on a yearly basis, detailed earnings data is only available
for the last two years of the survey.
28Funding was allocated based on the number of students enrolled, the number of university employees
and the areas that were used for teaching.
29This data was made available starting 2009. However, the algorithm used to allocate resources to
universities also changed. As a result, it would misleading to use recent data on spending per university.
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findings are important in light of the fact that there is a growing need to inform student
choice, given soaring tuition costs coupled with the fact that governments around the world
have been setting goals of increasing the number of STEM graduates.
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A Figures
Figure 1: Distribution of scores on the first round of the French Baccalaureate in the year
2002.
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0
.
2
.
4
.
6
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
8 10 12 14 16
Score on First Round of the Bac exam. Binwidth =0.05 points
(b) Distribution of remaining students after cut-
ting all heaped data)
Notes: Sample includes students who took the exam in the first round of the year 2002.
Histograms reported with bin width of 0.05 points. Panel B drops all individuals scoring
within 0.25 points to the left and 0.1 points to the right of each significant cutoff
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Figure 2: Testing for the smoothness of baseline characteristics
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(a) National exam scores in French in grade 11
10
15
Br
ev
et
 e
xa
m
 s
co
re
s 
in
 g
ra
de
 9
8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 11.5
Score on the first round of the baccalaureate
0.25 points bin averages Local linear RHS fit
Local linear LHS fit
Estimated Discontinuity: 0.158 (0.18)
(b) Brevet exam scores in grade 9
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Estimated Discontinuity: −0.847 (0.661)
(c) Mathematics exam scores in grade 6
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.022 (0.052)
(d) Socioeconomic Status
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Estimated Discontinuity: −0.098 (0.096)
(f) Birth order
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.138 (0.12)
(g) Number of siblings
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Estimated Discontinuity: −0.015 (0.045)
(h) Earnings Survey response rate
Notes: Sample includes students who took the exam in the first round of the year 2002.
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Figure 3: Predicted score based on baseline characteristics
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.028 (0.129)
(a) Local linear
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Estimated Discontinuity: −0.056 (0.103)
(b) Global Quadratic
Notes: Sample includes students who took the exam in the first round of the year 2002.
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Covariates include: Scores on the oral
and written portion of the Grade 11 national French exam, Score on the Brevet exam
in grade 9, mathematics scores on the grade 6 exam, socioeconomics status, number
of siblings, birth order, place of residence and gender.
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Figure 4: Likelihood of passing in the first round based on first round scores of the French
Baccalaureate exam (Global linear graph)
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Notes: Sample includes students who took the exam in the first round of the year 2002.
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Figure 5: Quantity of education effects based on first round scores of the French Baccalau-
reate exam
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(a) Likelihood of attaining a high school degree
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.0046 (0.043)
(b) Likelihood of attaining a Post-Baccalaureate
degree
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.071 (0.17)
(c) Years of Post-Baccalaureate education
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.393 (0.193)
(d) Age at Post-Baccalaureate graduation
Notes: Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round of
the year 2002. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Figure 6: Quality of education effects based on first round scores of the French Baccalaureate
exam
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(a) Average Baccalaureate score by attended in-
stitution
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.159(0.045)
(b) Likelihood of attending STEM major
Notes: Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round
of the year 2002. One standard deviation of a Baccalaureate test score is equivalent to
2.24 points. Standard errors clustered by university and reported in parentheses (Robust
standard errors used for STEM estimates).
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Figure 7: Labor market effects based on first round scores of the French Baccalaureate exam
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(a) Likelihood of employment
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(b) Monthly earnings(in Euros)
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(c) Monthly logged earnings
Notes: Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round
of the year 2002. Wages are stacked for the two most recent years provided(2010-2011).
Standard errors clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses.
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Figure 8: Distribution of scores on the first round of the French Baccalaureate in the year
2002 within a 9 to 11 Baccalaureate test score grade window.
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Notes: Sample includes students who took the exam in the first round of the year 2002.
Histogram reported with bin width of 0.05 points.
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B Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics for students who sat for the first round of the 2002 General
Baccalaureate exam
Variable Mean
Male 0.38
(0.48)
Birth order 1.74
(0.95)
Number of siblings 1.68
(1.17)
High S.E.S. 0.57
(0.49)
Score on the Grade 6 Mathematics exam 61.3
(8.62)
Score on the Brevet exam 13.7
(1.95)
Score on the French oral exam 12.2
(2.93)
Score on the French written exam 10.2
(2.94)
Score on the Baccalaureate exam 11.17
(2.24)
Percentage of first time passers 0.75
(0.43)
High school graduation rate 0.98
(0.14)
Years of Post-Baccalaureate education 3.2
(1.63)
STEM enrollment rate 0.28
(0.45)
Employment rate in 2011 and 2012 0.93
(0.25)
Monthly earnings in 2011 (in Euros) 1625
(818)
Monthly earnings in 2012 (in Euros) 1725
(881)
Observations 4337
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
The number of observations represents students with reported grades on the first round of the 2002
General Baccalaureate exam.
High S.E.S. is a dummy variable that represents father’s occupation where 1 denotes higher skilled
jobs and 0 denotes manual labor/ lower skilled jobs.
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Table 2: Regression Discontinuity estimates for baseline covariates.
Bandwidth 0.25 points 1 points 1.5 points 2 points 2.5 points 5 points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Discontinuity in Grade
11 French exam [Oral+ Written] –.119 –.098 .020 –.260 –.044 .042
(.26) (.24) (.20) (.26) (.24) (.24)
Panel B: Discontinuity in
Brevet exam in grade 9 .250 .131 .158 .193 .160 .101
(.24) (.23) (.19) (.25) (.23) (.23)
Panel C: Discontinuity in
National Maths exam in grade 6 .424 .034 –.516 –1.323 –.352 –.786
(1.06) (1.09) (.88) (1.18) (1.10) (1.05)
Panel D: Discontinuity in S.E.S .011 .094 .023 .037 .049 .049
(.07) (.07) (.05) (.07) (.06) (.06)
Panel E: Discontinuity in Gender –.057 .002 .003 –.019 –.025 –.030
(.07) (.06) (.05) (.07) (.06) (.06)
Panel F: Discontinuity in
birth order .001 –.021 –.098 –.019 –.088 –.154
(.13) (.13) (.10) (.13) (.12) (.12)
Panel G:: Discontinuity in
number of siblings .080 .205 .138 .228 .103 .098
(.14) (.14) (.12) (.15) (.14) (.14)
Panel H:: Discontinuity in
probability of being
in earnings survey .045 –.020 –.016 –.010 –.011 .018
(.05) (.04) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.04)
Score Polynomial Zero One One Two Two Three
Observations 401 1310 1855 2314 2717 3802
Notes: Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round of 2002.
Each cell represents a separate regression with baseline covariates as the dependent variable
and the treatment variable ‘scoring above 10 points’.
All specifications control for a flexible polynomial of score in which the slope is allowed to
vary on either side of the cutoff.
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Socioeconomic status proxied by father’s occupation.
Brevet exam graded from 0 to 20. Grade 6 exam graded from 0 to 78.
*** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
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Table 3: Regression discontinuity estimates for quantity of education measures
Bandwidth 0.5 points 1 points 1.5 points 2 points 2.5 points 5 points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Discontinuity in
likelihood of ever graduating
secondary school .010 .003 .003 –.005 –.008 .045**
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02)
With Controls .012 .003 .009 –.000 –.003 .045**
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.02)
Panel B: Discontinuity in
likelihood of having a post
Baccalaureate degree .050 .019 .005 –.018 .016 .023
(.04) (.05) (.04) (.06) (.05) (.05)
With Controls .051 .007 .003 –.016 .013 .003
(.04) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Panel C: Discontinuity in years
of Post-Baccalaureate education .304** .125 .071 .051 .070 .065
(.14) (.21) (.17) (.23) (.21) (.21)
With Controls .355** .185 .151 .172 .139 .079
(.16) (.23) (.18) (.24) (.22) (.22)
Panel D: Discontinuity in age
at Post-Baccalaureate graduation 0.201 0.191 0.393** 0.361 0.332 0.317
(0.15) (0.23) (0.19) (0.23) (0.21) (0.21)
With Controls .273 .229 .450** .396 .355 .288
(.18) (.26) (.21) (.28) (.25) (.25)
Score Polynomial Zero One One Two Two Three
Observations 679 1310 1855 2316 2720 3807
Notes: Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round of 2002.
Each cell represents a separate regression with educational outcomes as the dependent variable and
the treatment variable ’scoring above 10 points’.
All specifications control for a flexible polynomial of score in which the slope is allowed to vary on
either side of the cutoff.
Controls include exam specialization fixed effects, date of birth, number of siblings,birth order, socioe-
conomic status, scores on the Brevet examination, score on the grade 11 national French exam and
scores in grade 6 national assessment exam in mathematics. Number of observations reduced slightly
with the addition of controls.
*** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table 4: Regression discontinuity estimates for education quality measures using different bandwidths and specifications
Bandwidth 0.5 points 1 points 1.5 points 2 points 2.5 points 5 points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Discontinuity in average
institution Baccalaureate score
(i.e. Average peer quality) .217*** .246** .261*** .307** .260*** .292**
(.07) (.10) (.09) (.12) (.10) (.12)
With Controls .222*** .233** .257*** .293*** .234*** .259***
(.07) (.09) (.07) (.10) (.08) (.09)
Panel B: Average peer quality
measured in one Standard Deviation
of a Baccalaureate score .097*** .110** .117*** .138** .117*** .131**
(.03) (.05) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.05)
With Controls .099*** .105** .115*** .131*** .105*** .116***
(.03) (.04) (.03) (.05) (.03) (.04)
Panel C: Discontinuity in
likelihood of being
in STEM major .107*** .124** .159*** .151** .160*** .170***
(.04) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.06) (.05)
With Controls .116*** .115** .161*** .157*** .167*** .163***
(.04) (.05) (.04) (.06) (.05) (.05)
Score Polynomial Zero One One Two Two Three
Observations 630 1254 1793 2245 2641 3715
Notes: Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round of 2002.
Each cell represents a separate regression with educational outcome as the dependent variable and the treatment
variable ’scoring above 10 points’.
All specifications control for a flexible polynomial of score in which the slope varies on either side of the cutoff.
Our preferred specification for earnings is the local linear regression of bandwidth 1.5 points, which has been
computed using the method proposed in Calocino et. al (2014).
Controls include exam specialization fixed effects, date of birth, number of siblings,birth order, socioeconomic
status, scores on the Brevet examination, score on the grade 11 national French exam and scores in grade 6
national assessment exam in Mathematics. Number of observations reduced slightly with the addition of controls.
*** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1. Standard errors clustered by university and reported in parentheses.
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Table 5: Regression discontinuity estimates for labor market outcomes using different bandwidths and specifications
Bandwidth 0.5 points 1 points 1.5 points 2 points 2.5 points 5 points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Discontinuity in
Employment rates –.019 –.029 –.008 –.015 .009 .002
(.02) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.03)
With Controls –.033 –.035 –.020 –.024 .006 –.003
(.02) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Panel B: Discontinuity in net
monthly earnings (Euros) 250.29*** 343.57*** 252.03*** 340.58*** 279.5*** 255.40***
(62.59) (92.57) (72.57) (96.56) (87.96) (88.00)
With Controls 218.58*** 275.13*** 242.72*** 313.47*** 243.42*** 222.49**
(63.15) (93.95) (72.07) (97.41) (87.24) (87.18)
Panel C: Discontinuity in
monthly logged earnings .126*** .180*** .128*** .176*** .142*** .147***
(.04) (.06) (.04) (.06) (.05) (.06)
With Controls .120*** .140** .129*** .172*** .132** .144**
(.04) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Score Polynomial Zero One One Two Two Three
Observations 711 1404 1991 2532 3003 4296
Notes: Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round of 2002.
Each cell represents a separate regression with labor market outcomes as the dependent variable and the treatment variable ‘scoring above
10 points’.
All specifications control for a flexible polynomial of score in which the slope is allowed to vary on either side of the cutoff.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses.
Our preferred specification for earnings is the local linear regression of bandwidth 1.5 points, which has been computed using the method
proposed in Calocino et. al (2014).
Controls include exam specialization fixed effects, date of birth, number of siblings,birth order, socioeconomic status, scores on the Brevet
examination, score on the grade 11 national French exam, scores in grade 6 national assessment exam in Mathematics. Number of
observations reduced slightly with the addition of controls.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses.
*** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
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Table 6: ‘Donut’ type Regression discontinuity estimates for quantity of education variables
Bandwidth 0.5 points 1 points 1.5 points 2 points 2.5 points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Discontinuity in
likelihood of ever graduating
secondary school
(Excluding [9.75-10.1] region) .007 –.006 –.002 –.023 –.024
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02)
(Excluding [9.65-10.1] region) .011 –.000 .002 –.022 –.024
(.01) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.02)
Panel B: Discontinuity in
likelihood of having a post
Baccalaureate degree
(Excluding [9.75-10.1] region) .010 .078 .068 .019 .003
(.06) (.08) (.06) (.09) (.08)
(Excluding [9.65-10.1] region) .085 .074 .017 –.009 .061
(.05) (.10) (.06) (.11) (.09)
Panel C: Discontinuity in years
of Post-Baccalaureate education
(Excluding [9.75-10.1] region) .443** .318 .145 .226 .211
(.17) (.31) (.22) (.34) (.30)
(Excluding [9.65-10.1] region) .406** .172 .039 .030 .059
(.20) (.37) (.25) (.41) (.35)
Score Polynomial Zero One One Two Two
Observations (excluding 9.75-10.1) 411 1042 1587 2048 2452
Observations (excluding 9.65-10.1) 361 992 1537 1998 2402
Notes: Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round of 2002.
Each cell represents a separate regression with educational outcomes as the dependent variable and
the treatment variable ’scoring above 10 points’.
All specifications control for a flexible polynomial of score in which the slope is allowed to vary on
either side of the cutoff.
*** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Table 7: ‘Donut’ type Regression discontinuity estimates for quality of education variables
Bandwidth 0.5 points 1 points 1.5 points 2 points 2.5 points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Discontinuity in average
institution Baccalaureate score
(Excluding [9.75-10.1] region) .291*** .377*** .337*** .455*** .387***
(.08) (.13) (.09) (.17) (.12)
(Excluding [9.65-10.1] region) .286*** .425*** .362*** .530*** .414***
(.09) (.15) (.11) (.19) (.13)
Panel B: Discontinuity in likelihood
of being in STEM major
(Excluding [9.75-10.1] region) .111** .150* .187*** .209** .209***
(.05) (.08) (.06) (.09) (.08)
(Excluding [9.65-10.1] region) .127** .207** .231*** .286*** .270***
(.05) (.10) (.07) (.11) (.09)
Score Polynomial Zero One One Two Two
Observations (excluding 9.75-10.1) 403 1027 1566 2018 2414
Observations (excluding 9.65-10.1) 358 982 1521 1973 2369
Notes: Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round of 2002.
Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round of 2002.
Each cell represents a separate regression with labor market outcomes as the dependent variable and the
treatment variable ‘scoring above 10 points’.
All specifications control for a flexible polynomial of score in which the slope is allowed to vary on either
side of the cutoff.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses.
*** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1. Standard errors clustered by university and reported in parentheses
(Robust standard errors used for STEM estimates).
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Table 8: ‘Donut’ type Regression discontinuity estimates for labor market variables
Bandwidth 0.5 points 1 points 1.5 points 2 points 2.5 points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Discontinuity in
likelihood of employment
(Excluding [9.75-10.1] region) –.011 –.021 .012 .020 .050
(.03) (.05) (.04) (.06) (.05)
(Excluding [9.65-10.1] region) –.032 –.061 –.008 –.022 .031
(.03) (.06) (.04) (.07) (.06)
Panel B: Discontinuity in
net monthly earnings
(Excluding [9.75-10.1] region) 276.763*** 439.358*** 275.388*** 457.806*** 321.402***
(81.43) (138.75) (94.90) (145.81) (124.27)
(Excluding [9.65-10.1] region) 236.559*** 401.969** 211.524** 367.397** 224.037
(89.70) (162.32) (105.61) (168.49) (141.90)
Score Polynomial Zero One One Two Two
Observations (excluding 9.75-10.1) 433 1128 1715 2256 2727
Observations (excluding 9.65-10.1) 375 1070 1657 2198 2669
Notes: Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round of 2002.
Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round of 2002.
Each cell represents a separate regression with labor market outcomes as the dependent variable and the
treatment variable ‘scoring above 10 points’.
All specifications control for a flexible polynomial of score in which the slope is allowed to vary on either
side of the cutoff.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses.
*** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1. Standard errors clustered at the individual level and reported in paren-
theses.
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Table 9: Regression discontinuity estimates for individuals from low socioeconomic backgrounds
Bandwidth 0.5 points 1 points 1.5 points 2 points 2.5 points 5 points
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Averaged institution
Baccalaureate score .149 .107 .173 .235 .159 .059
(.10) (.17) (.12) (.18) (.17) (.10)
Panel B: Likelihood of being in
STEM major .178*** .234*** .264*** .296*** .304*** .317***
(.05) (.07) (.06) (.08) (.07) (.07)
Panel C: Monthly logged earnings .138*** .187*** .108** .188*** .126** .129**
(.04) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Score Polynomial Zero One One Two Two Three
Observations 327 674 959 1181 1369 1795
Notes: Number of observations corresponds to the earnings measures. This number is smaller for the quality
outcome measures. Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round of 2002.
Each cell represents a separate regression with previously significant outcome variables as the dependent variable
and the treatment variable ‘scoring above 10 points’.
All specifications control for a flexible polynomial of score in which the slope is allowed to vary on either side of
the cutoff.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses.
*** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
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C Appendix Figures
Figure A1: Quantity of education effects based on first round scores of the French Baccalau-
reate exam (Global Polynomial Graphs).
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(a) Likelihood of attaining a high school degree
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.008(0.035)
(b) Likelihood of attaining a Post-Baccalaureate
degree
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.081 (0.136)
(c) Years of Post-Baccalaureate education
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Ag
e 
at
 g
ra
du
at
io
n 
fro
m
 h
ig
he
r e
du
ca
tio
n
5 10 15
Score on the first round of the baccalaureate
0.25 points bin averages Cubic RHS fit
Cubic LHS fit
Estimated Discontinuity: 0.318 (0.212)
(d) Age at Post-Baccalaureate graduation
Notes: Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round of
the year 2002. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Figure A2: Quality of education effects based on first round scores of the French Baccalau-
reate exam (Global polynomial graphs)
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.31 (0.010)
(a) Average Baccalaureate score by attended in-
stitution
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.144(0.045)
(b) Likelihood of attending STEM major
Notes: Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round of
the year 2002. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Figure A3: Quality of education ‘graduation’ effects based on first round scores of the French
Baccalaureate exam
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.247 (0.076)
(a) Average Baccalaureate score by graduated in-
stitution
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.107(0.042)
(b) Likelihood of graduating STEM major
Notes: Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round of
the year 2002. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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Figure A4: Labor market effects based on first round scores of the French Baccalaureate
exam (Global Polynomial Graphs)
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
1.
1
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t R
at
e
0 5 10 15 20
Score on the first round of the baccalaureate
0.25 points bin averages Global Cubic RHS fit
Global Cubic LHS fit
Estimated Discontinuity: −0.009 (0.028)
(a) Likelihood of employment
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.122 (0.044)
(b) Monthly logged earnings
Notes: Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round
of the year 2002. Wages are stacked for the two most recent years provided(2010-2011).
Standard errors clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses.
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Figure A5: Placebo test - T-statistics for reduced form effects on logged monthly wages using
various fake cutoff scores
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Notes: Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round of the
year 2002. Each open circle represents the t-statistic from a local linear regression of bandwidth
= 1.5 Baccalaureate points, using logged monthly wages as the dependent variable. A grade of
zero on the x-axis represents the original passing threshold grade of 10, and we simulate 50 fake
cutoff treatment effects to the right and left of that point within intervals of 0.1 score points.
Clustered standard errors are used for computation of t-stats.
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Figure A6: Discontinuity in earnings for individuals who never attended college (Global
Polynomial Graph)
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.099 (0.096)
Notes: Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round of the year
2002. Wages are stacked for the two most recent years provided(2010-2011). Standard errors
clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses.
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Figure A7: Discontinuity in age at graduation from secondary school
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Estimated Discontinuity: 0.024 (0.041)
Notes: Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round of the
year 2002. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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D Appendix Tables
Table A1: Regression discontinuity estimates for baseline characteristics at all important cutoffs
cutoff = 8 cutoff = 12 cutoff = 14 cutoff = 16
Panel A: Disc. in French lit. exam .403 .056 –.033 –.579
(.33) (.18) (.25) (0.43)
Panel B: Disc. in Brevet exam in grade 9 .032 .109 –.227 –.458
(.29) (.17) (.24) (0.41)
Panel C: Disc. in Grade 6 math exam 2.090 1.164 –.086 –1.071
(1.62) (.76) (.86) (1.74)
Panel D: Disc. in S.E.S .02 –.024 –.069 –.183
(.07) (.05) (.06) (.13)
Panel E: Disc. in Gender –.158** .042 –.044 –.084
(.08) (.05) (.06) (.12)
Panel F: Disc in birth order –.038 –.120 .053 .173
(.15) (.08) (.11) (.19)
Panel G: Disc in no. of siblings –.241 –.206* –.377*** .279
(.25) (.11) (.14) (.23)
Observations 694 1648 880 258
Notes: Sample includes students who took the French Baccalaureate in the first round of 2002.
Each cell represents a separate regression with baseline covariates as the dependent variable
and the treatment variable ‘scoring above cutoff’. All estimates represent local linear regressions of bandwidth 1.5 points
All specifications control for a flexible polynomial of score in which the slope is allowed to
vary on either side of the cutoff.
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
*** p <0.01 ** p <0.05 * p <0.1
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Table A2: Organization of high school in France
Brevet	  	  	  
Cer(ﬁcate	  of	  
professional	  
ap(tude	  CAP	  	  
(2	  years)	  
Professional	  
Baccalaureate	  	  
(1	  year	  a;er	  CAP	  
and	  3	  years	  a;er	  
Brevet)	  
Technological	  	  
Baccalaureate	  	  
(2	  years)	  
General	  	  
Baccalaureate	  	  
(2	  years)	  
Professional	  Lyceum	  	  	  
Technological	  and	  General	  	  
Lyceums	  	  	  
First	  year	  in	  lyceum	  
(common	  to	  students	  in	  the	  
general	  and	  technological	  
tracks)	  
200	  specializa(ons	  	  	  
80	  
specializa(ons	  	  	  
3	  specializa(ons:	  
Sciences,	  Economics/
Sociology	  and	  
Literature	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Table A3: Organization of higher education in France
Baccalaureate	  	  
First	  year	  	  
(common	  to	  all	  
medical	  degrees)	  
Midwifery	  
degree	  
	  (4	  years)	  
General	  
Medicine	  
(8	  years)	  
Den<st	  
Degree	  
	  (5	  years)	  
Pharmacist	  
Degree	  
(5	  years)	  
Medical	  
Specialty	  
(2	  years)	  
Dental	  
Specialty	  
(2	  years)	  
Pharmacy	  
Specialty	  	  
(3	  years)	  
First	  2	  years	  
of	  Bachelor’s	  
Degree	  
Engineering	  
Degree	  	  
(3	  years	  aFer	  
Bachelor’s	  or	  5	  
years	  aFer	  
Baccalaureate)	  
Master’s	  
Degree	  (2	  
years)	  
Preparatory	  
classes	  for	  
Grandes	  
Ecoles	  	  
(2	  years)	  
Grandes	  Ecoles	  
Degree	  
(3	  years	  aFer	  
preparatory	  
classes	  	  or	  5	  
years	  aFer	  
Baccalaureate)	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Table A4: Organization of higher vocational system in France
Scien&ﬁc	  
and	  
Technical	  
University	  
Degree	  
	  (2	  years)	  
Baccalaureate	  	  
Technological	  
University	  
Degree	  
	  (2	  years)	  
First	  2	  years	  of	  
Bachelor’s	  Degree	  
(in	  general	  higher	  
educa&on	  track)	  
Professional	  Bachelor’s	  
Degree	  	  
(1	  year)	  
Other	  degrees	  such	  
as	  arts	  and	  	  
paramedical	  
degrees,	  etc…	  
(3	  to	  5	  years)	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Table A5: Classification of majors into STEM and non-STEM degrees
appendix.pdf
1. STEM designated majors
Agricultural sciences
Economic sciences
Engineering
Fundamental sciences and applications
Life sciences, health and earth sciences
Materials sciences
Medical degrees
Pharmacy
Sciences and technology
2. Non-STEM majors
Accounting degrees
Arts
Higher technical certificate of production
Higher technical certificate of services
Languages
Paramedical degrees
Political Sciences
Professional degrees
Social sciences and humanities degrees
Social work degrees
Sports
Technical degrees
1
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